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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 21/01/2008 Accident number: 494 
Accident time: 06:50 Accident Date: 05/07/2007 





Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Mechanical excavation Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: YM-11 AT blast Ground condition: building rubble 
route (verge) 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 21/01/2008 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate survey (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
mechanical detonation (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
non-injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
A letter about this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion 
to a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
letter is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text 
1 
in [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if the full investigation report is made available in 
future. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 
OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON DAFA MDU ON JULY 05, 2007 AT  
KHAROTI VILLAGE, BAGRAM DISTRICT OF PARWAN 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
As a result of a demining accident on [National demining agency] MDU-1 backhoe machine at 
06:50 am, July 05, 2007 in task # AF/0308/01663/MF146 located at Kharoti village, Bagram 
district of Parwan province, investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to conduct the 
investigation and find out the main causes of the accident.                                                                                          
Fortunately the accident had no any casualty. 
 
SUMMARY: 
The mentioned mine contaminated area is a township for refugees consist of routes and 
ruined houses recorded by LIS as SHA# 1 of HQ 1232.  
The area was not anticipated to be contaminated by AT mine, so [National demining agency] 
MDU # 1 Backhoe machine and DT # 2 were deployed for clearance of this task. 
The machine was preparing the ground for manual parties in one of the routes that the teeth 
of bucket hit top of an anti tank YM-11 Iranian mine and caused it to explode. 
As a result of the explosion four teeth of bucket were broken and scattered to different 
distances, damaged one side of bucket, armoured front wind shield of cabin, one hydraulic 
pipe and foot shield of cabin.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
1. The following points were found by investigation team: 
2. The area was recorded by LIS as AP contaminated area and was confirmed by LIAT 
on 03/02/006. 
3. The task was surveyed as anti personnel mine contaminated area, but contrary to 
expectation an anti tank mine was exploded under the bucket. 
4. There was not a proper site plan for the clearance of the task which shows lack of 
supervision and monitoring of the task. 
5. Before the accident an empty case of AT mine was found/observed by the team in 
the area, which indicated the presence of AT mine, but the team ignored it and 
continued to use the MDU. 
6. The team documentation and recording system was poor, the MDU leader could not 





The following points are to be considered: 
1. Explosion of anti tank YM-11 mine in the task proved that AT mines also exist in the 
area, which requires changing the clearance method. 
2. Reassessment of the area is to be done by AMAC operations Associate/Assistant, 
[National demining agency] supervisor/ team leader and LIAT for further course of 
actions. 
3. The site clearance plan is to be approved by AMAC and a copy of the approved 
operational plan is to be retained with AMAC. 
4. When DT team leader found some facts that indicate the need for change of the plan, 
he should inform AMAC through chain of command and bring the required changes to 
the clearance plan. 
5. Retraining of team command group is recommended with focusing on the preparation 
of task clearance plan and its flexibility for change. 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as “inadequate survey” because the survey had 
not identified a threat from AT mines in that area. 
The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the field controllers did 
not adjust the clearance plan after they found evidence of AT mines at the site. It is likely that 
was an indication of inadequate training. 
This record will be revised if the full investigation report is made available in future. 
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